ZBB 2012, 439
The Case for Abolishing Sovereign Debtors’ Privileges
Contents
- I. Introduction
- II. Privileges Granted to Sovereign Debtors
- 1. Prospectus Requirement
- 2. Continuous Disclosure Obligations
- 3. Market Integrity (Prohibition on Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation)
- 4. Assessment of Credit Risk by Banks
- 5. Conclusion
- III. Learning from the Crisis: Treating Sovereign Debtors and Private Debtors More Alike
- 1. Sovereign Debt is not safer than Private Debt
- 2. Sovereign Debtors have the same Incentives for Opportunistic Behavior
ZBB 2012, 440
- 3. Individual Exemptions are not Justified
- 3.1 Prospectus Requirement
- 3.2 Continuous Disclosure of Information
- 3.3 Market Integrity (Prohibition on Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation)
- 3.4 Assessment of Credit Risk by Banks
- 4. Need for Sovereign Immunity?
- 5. Conclusion
- *
- *)Professor, Dr. iur., LL.M. (Yale), Chair of Civil Law, German and International Corporate, Business and Antitrust Law, Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Germany. This article is taken from a larger article (“Combating the Financial Crisis – European and German Corporate and Securities Laws and the Case for Abolishing Sovereign Debtors’ Privileges”) which is forthcoming in 48 Tex. Int’l L.J. (2013); it has been modified and partially supplemented.
Der Inhalt dieses Beitrags ist nicht frei verfügbar.
Für Abonnenten ist der Zugang zu Aufsätzen und Rechtsprechung frei.
Sollten Sie über kein Abonnement verfügen, können Sie den gewünschten Beitrag trotzdem kostenpflichtig erwerben:
Erwerben Sie den gewünschten Beitrag kostenpflichtig per Rechnung.
Erwerben Sie den gewünschten Beitrag kostenpflichtig mit PayPal.