ZBB 2026, 231
Recapitalisation in Resolution: From Bail-in to Loss-Absorbing Capacity and Resolution Funding Mechanisms
Modern bank resolution regimes emerged in the aftermath of the global financial crisis as structured alternatives to ad hoc crisis management. While international standards, in particular the Financial Stability Board’s Key Attributes, have shaped their design, implementation remains uneven across jurisdictions. Focusing on Hong Kong and Singapore, this contribution examines the architecture of their resolution frameworks, with particular emphasis on bail-in mechanisms, loss-absorbing capacity requirements and resolution financing arrangements, and situates these within the broader international policy debate.
Contents
- I. Introductory remarks
- II. The rationale and architecture of modern bank resolution regimes
- 1. From impromptu rescue measures to a dedicated framework
- 2. Preconditions for resolution
- 3. Core resolution tools and principle of private-sector burden-sharing
- III. Bail-in: general principles and their implementation in Hong Kong and Singapore
- IV. Effectiveness of bail-in: the rising case for LAC requirements
- V. Resolution financing arrangements: general considerations and the situation in Hong Kong and Singapore
- VI. Conclusion and outlook
- *
- *)Dr. iur. habil. (Humboldt), LL.M. (NYU), LL.M. (NUS); Associate Professor and Deputy Director of the Centre for Banking & Finance Law (CBFL), Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore; Co-Director of the Centre for Transnational Legal Studies (London) for the 2025/26 academic year
Der Inhalt dieses Beitrags ist nicht frei verfügbar.
Für Abonnenten ist der Zugang zu Aufsätzen und Rechtsprechung frei.
Sollten Sie über kein Abonnement verfügen, können Sie den gewünschten Beitrag trotzdem kostenpflichtig erwerben:
Erwerben Sie den gewünschten Beitrag kostenpflichtig per Rechnung.
Erwerben Sie den gewünschten Beitrag kostenpflichtig mit PayPal.