ZBB 2026, 155
EU Agencies as Punishers – A Special Case?
The article stresses that many EU “administrative” sanctions (fines, periodic penalty payments, exclusion from schemes, blacklisting) may qualify as “criminal” in the autonomous ECHR sense when the Engel criteria are met: wide scope, punitive/deterrent purpose and significant severity.
It underlines that, once a sanction falls within Engel, Article 6 ECHR procedural guarantees (independent tribunal, fair hearing, rights of the defence, presumption of innocence, ne bis in idem) must apply, which has direct repercussions under Articles 47–50 of the Charter.
In competition and similar “punitive administrative” regimes it argues for a robust standard of judicial review, rejecting purely marginal control where EU bodies (Commission or agencies) impose sanctions based on complex economic and technical assessments.
The article also points out that EU law long tried to avoid openly classifying sanctions as “criminal”, relying instead on general principles (effectiveness, proportionality, rights of defence), but that the Charter and ECtHR case law now force a clearer taxonomy between reparatory and punitive sanctions.
Examples like agricultural/financial-interest sanctions, competition fines, and blacklisting/exclusion measures are used to illustrate that some sanctions previously presented as merely “administrative” or even “contractual” are, in substance, punitive and therefore trigger stricter legality and fault requirements, and stronger judicial scrutiny.
In the agency context, “unlimited jurisdiction” over penalties would work exactly as in competition law: the EU Courts can fully revisit the amount of an agency-imposed fine or periodic penalty payment.
Contents
- I. Introduction
- II. General observations on sanctioning and judical review
- 1. ECtHR and EU courts: there is a precedent for (almost) everything
- 2. Judicial review of penalties: how “unlimited” is “unlimited jurisdiction”?
- III. EU agencies and sanctioning
- 1. Diversity of sanctioning powers?
- 2. The silence of the Treaties – the eloquence of the CJEU
- 3. Diverging legal framework
- 3.1 Review by the Court of Justice
- 3.2 Procedures and rights of participants
- 3.3 Publication of “measures”
- IV. Further questions and tentative conclusions
- *
- *)PhD, LL.M. (University of Luxembourg), Chair of the Board of Appeal at ACER (The EU Agency for cooperation of Energy Regulators), Ljubljana. The statements in this article are solely attributable to the author and do not engage the Board of Appeal of ACER or the agency in any way.
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